A. To the First Argument

274. To the first initial argument [n.175] I say that the proposition ‘when the prior is destroyed the posterior is also destroyed’ is true of the simply prior, namely a prior on which the posterior depends; but it is not true of what is in some way prior yet on which the posterior does not essentially depend (as is the case with ordered effects, where the nearer cause is said to be prior to the more remote cause, and yet it would be possible sometimes for a cause to issue in a second effect though it were impeded by a first).

275. It could in another way be said that the proposition is true unless something else prior to the prior supplies the place of the prior, as is the case with God and the subject in respect of the accident here [sc. in the Eucharist].

276. The first response [n.274], however, is doubtful: how can a posterior effect be without the prior effect of the same cause when there is an essential order between the effects? For it was said often in Ord. I [d.17 nn.42, 83; d.27 n.83; also II d.1 nn.41, 44] that when a cause is of a nature to have ordered effects, it is not in proximate potency to producing the remoter effect unless the nearer effect has already been produced; and for this reason the Holy Spirit can only be spirated by the Father and the Son together, and for this reason a creature can only be created by the three Divine Persons together, and much else said there [Ord. I d.11 nn.12-18; d.12 nn.7, 27, 36; d.20 n.27].

277. The second response too [n.275] does not have place here, because although God may supply the place here [sc. in the Eucharist], that is, supply the causality of the subject in respect of the accident by conserving the accident without a subject, yet he does not supply the place of inherence in a subject, about which it is argued that it is prior to action extrinsically, unless you say that to this extent he supplies the place of inherence because he conserves it in being.

278. However, as to the form of the argument [sc. of the first initial argument, n.175], reply can be made by denying the minor, because the ‘being in’ of an accident is not essentially prior necessarily to ‘acting extrinsically’ (speaking of ‘being in some substance’), because both belong to an accident contingently, and the posterior also contingently has the prior before it. Indeed, action necessarily and essentially presupposes the being of the active form; but the fact that ‘being in’ is concomitant with ‘being’ is not necessary, nor necessarily pre-required for acting.

279. But when both respects, namely ‘being in’ and ‘acting extrinsically’, belong to the same form absolutely, then, although both come from outside, yet the first is not contingently disposed to the foundation in the way the second respect is, because the foundation (while the order of natural causes stands) always has the first effect, not so the second effect. And more things can prevent the second effect from ‘being-in’ than can prevent the first effect from ‘being-in’, because an impeding contrary can deprive the form of its acting, but only God can deprive it of its ‘being-in’.

280. Therefore, the minor [n.179] is false, because ‘being-in’ is not essentially prior to acting, but only being is essentially prior to acting, while ‘being-in’ is simply prior when considering the order of natural causes.

281. And then as to the confirmation about immediacy [sc. about ‘proper attribute’, n.176], I say that not everything that is more immediate to something is necessarily presupposed to everything more mediate, as that if the more immediate thing is not a cause with respect to the mediate thing (neither an active cause nor a receptive cause), the effect too is not simply necessarily nearer to the same cause. And so it is in the issue at hand: for ‘being-in’ has this immediacy, because by natural causes it follows the foundation at once, namely such that by no natural cause is it impeded; not so with ‘acting’. But yet neither is ‘being-in’ an elicitive or receptive idea, nor is its effect simply necessarily prior to ‘acting’.

282. And if you say: ‘being-in’ is the proper attribute, ‘acting’ is an accident per accidens [n.176], the response is plain in the first question of this distinction [nn.32-33, 52, 77, 80]. For ‘being-in’ is not altogether a proper attribute, but it is a contingently inhering accident, though it happens for the most part; but an accident that happens for the most part does not necessarily precede an accident that happens for the least part, or happens either way.